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KNOWLEDGE FLOWS WITHIN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: EXPLAINING 
SUBSIDIARY ISOLATION AND ITS PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS 
=
ABSTRACT 
Applying a new theoretical and empirical approach to intra-firm knowledge transfers, this paper 
provides some initial insight to the little-researched phenomenon of why some subsidiaries are isolated 
from knowledge transfer activities within the MNC. Knowledge transfer is framed as a problemistic 
search process initiated by the recipient unit.  We show that knowledge flows from units that are 
perceived to be highly capable to units that perceive themselves to be highly capable. Knowledge 
flows are also associated with existing levels of communication and reciprocity.  Taken together, these 
findings suggest that knowledge transfers in MNCs typically occur between highly capable members 
of an in-crowd, while the isolated minority rarely, if ever, engage in knowledge sharing activities. 
Finally, we show that the isolated minority underperforms other subsidiaries, suggesting the possibility 
of a “liability of internal isolation”. 
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 Over the last several years there has been widespread interest among scholars in the 
importance of knowledge management in organisations and, particularly, in multinational corporations 
(e.g. Eisenhardt & Santos, 2002; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 
2001, 2003; Szulanksi, 1996; Zander & Kogut, 1995). The idea that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) create value from the internalization of their accumulated knowledge and from their 
knowledge “assets” (e.g. patents, trade secrets, and organizational routines) can be traced back to the 
pioneering work of Hymer (1960), Caves (1971) and Buckley & Casson (1976), among others. Today 
there is a broad consensus that a MNC is “an international network that creates, accesses, integrates 
and applies knowledge in multiple locations” (Almeida, Song & Grant, 2002:148). In order to respond 
effectively to its environmental heterogeneity, the MNC must differentiate the activities of its 
subsidiaries but it must also integrate them (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989).As Schulz (2003) puts it, the 
integration of the knowledge of the MNC on a worldwide basis, although difficult, is what enables 
MNCs to reap the “incremental value of being multinational” (Kogut, 1989: 383).  
The reality, however, is that knowledge integration within the MNC is far from perfect. There 
is ample evidence in the literature that knowledge is sticky and that leading-edge management 
practices do not flow rapidly and uneventfully from country to country (e.g. Chew, Bresnahan and 
Clark, 1990; Leibenstein, 1966; Szulanski, 1995, 1996; Teece, 1981). Prior research has examined the 
difficulties of transferring tacit and complex knowledge within the organization (e.g. Szulanksi, 1996; 
Zander & Kogut, 1995), the importance of motivation and absorptive capacity for transferring 
knowledge (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000) and the relevance of central network positions in 
intraorganizational knowledge transfers (e.g. Tsai, 2001).  
An equally important but underexplored phenomenon is the tendency for some subsidiaries to 
be isolated from the knowledge transfer activities within the MNC. Previous research (e.g. Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Hansen & Lovas, 2004) has implicitly indicated the existence of subsidiaries that 
are isolated from intra-firm inflows and outflows of knowledge.  And our data, as described later, 
reveals the magnitude of this phenomenon: out of our sample of 171 subsidiary units, 22% 
experienced inflows of new products or practices from the MNC’s headquarters less than once per 
year, 42% participated in outflows of new products or practices less than once per year, and 13% 
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experienced neither inflows nor outflows more than once per year.   These isolated subsidiaries may 
well be underperforming in their local markets if they do not have access to the broader knowledge 
base of the MNC, and their existence may also be symptomatic of a more fundamental problem of 
knowledge sharing in the corporation.  
However, there is practically no attempt to explain theoretically and empirically the reasons 
why some subsidiaries are isolated from the knowledge transfer activities within the MNC nor the 
impact of internal isolation on subsidiary performance. Instead, most of the existing literature tend to 
focus on identifying the barriers and facilitators of knowledge transfers from the perspective of those 
subsidiaries that are already involved in knowledge transfer activities – colloquially known as the “in-
crowd”—and disregards the group of subsidiaries that is simply isolated from any knowledge transfer 
activity within the MNC.  For instance, the very way Szulanski (1996) designed his research ensured 
that it took into account only those units that were already involved with a best-practice transfer. And 
even those studies (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991, 1994) that explicitly indicate that some subsidiaries 
(e.g. “local innovators”) may not participate in the knowledge sharing activities within a MNC fail to 
investigate what are the performance consequences of subsidiary isolation for the “isolated” 
subsidiaries (i.e. those that experience few if any intrafirm knowledge outflows or inflows).  
We believe that it is important to advance the literature on intrafirm knowledge transfers by 
investigating the isolated subsidiary phenomenon and its performance consequences. Two questions 
guide our research. First, what explains the pattern of knowledge flows that give rise to subsidiary 
isolation?  Second, what is the impact of subsidiary isolation on subsidiary performance? 
Unlike Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) who used communication theory (2000:475), we 
address our first question by developing a demand-driven model of knowledge flow that builds on the 
behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963). And unlike Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) 
who focused on the transmission of knowledge between sender and recipient, our relative emphasis is 
on the initiation of that process (Szulanski, 1996; 2000).  We focus on the recipients of knowledge 
flows as they engage in a process of problemistic search within the context of a MNC in which there is 
very limited awareness of where its useful knowledge resides. This framing suggests that the 
subjective evaluation of a subsidiary’s capabilities by itself and by others drives the knowledge flow 
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process. As we describe in detail below, knowledge outflows are predicted by other units evaluating 
the focal subsidiary highly, whereas inflows are predicted by the focal subsidiary evaluating itself 
highly.  And those units that are evaluated poorly by both themselves and by others are likely to 
become isolated.  We also suggest that the level of communication and the existence of reciprocity 
between units will further strengthen these patterns of knowledge flow, thereby exacerbating the 
phenomenon of subsidiary isolation.  This pattern may result in some subsidiaries finding themselves 
in self-reinforcing spirals of knowledge sharing with others, while the self-reinforcing cycle is a 
downward spiral for the isolated subsidiaries that neither send nor receive knowledge flows. 
Equally important in this paper is the examination of the performance of isolated subsidiaries 
vis-à-vis that of subsidiaries which participate in the knowledge transfer activities within the MNC. 
We will argue that subsidiaries that are alienated from the knowledge transfer activities within the firm 
not only fail to benefit from the specific knowledge of other units within the MNC (e.g. new products 
developed by another subsidiary), they also end up not participating in an information network that is 
a vehicle for the rapid communication of news about opportunities and obstacles. We conjecture that 
similar to the idea of liability of (external) unconnectedness (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996) 
there is a liability of internal isolation and we hypothesize that, all other things equal, the isolated 
subsidiaries have a lower performance than those subsidiaries that regularly receive and send 
knowledge within the MNC. 
In the body of the paper, we conduct an empirical test of these arguments using nodal data that 
focuses on the perceived capabilities, knowledge flows, and performance of subsidiary units. We 
should also note at this stage that we focus on one specific type of knowledge: marketing 
knowledge—know-how about new products and new services and marketing best practices. 
Knowledge inflows are therefore the aggregate volume of know-how about new products and new 
services and marketing best practices received either from other subsidiaries (horizontal inflows) or 
from the MNC headquarters (vertical inflows) by the focal subsidiary; and knowledge outflows are the 
aggregate volume of know-how about new products and new services and marketing best practices 
transmitted from the focal subsidiary to other subsidiaries (horizontal outflows) or to the HQ (vertical 
outflows). 
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Our data set consists of questionnaire responses from the managers of 171 subsidiaries 
belonging to six large Swedish multinationals (Sandvik Steel, Coromant, Ericsson, Volvo, Pharmacia 
and Alfa Laval Agri), plus evaluations of those same subsidiaries by their corporate HQ and their 
peers. We receive broad support for the arguments.  In the final section of the paper, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for both theory and practice.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
What is the nature of knowledge flows in a MNC where knowledge is dispersed, sticky, and 
imperfectly evaluated?  In this section we develop a set of theoretical arguments based on the 
behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), which leads to the development of specific 
hypotheses regarding the conditions under which we would expect to see knowledge flows into and 
out of the focal subsidiary.  
Problemistic Search and Perception Gaps 
The behavioural theory of the firm is rooted in the pioneering work of Herbert Simon and 
James March (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947) and was formally introduced in Cyert and 
March’s (1963) book of the same name. The principles of this theory are now applied broadly in the 
organisational literature in such sub-fields as organizational learning, decision theory, and the 
internationalization of the firm (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). In this paper we build on assumptions 
that managers are boundedly rational (i.e. they have significant cognitive limitations) and that they 
satisfice (i.e. they seek out an acceptable solution to a problem, rather than an optimal one).  We then 
focus on the process of problemistic search, that is “search that is stimulated by a problem and is 
directed toward finding a solution to that problem” (Cyert and March, 1963: 121). Problemistic search 
is assumed to be (1) motivated by a particular problem such as a failure to satisfy one of its goals, it is 
(2) simple-minded, meaning that it proceeds on the basis of a simple model of causality unless driven 
to a more complex one, and it is (3) biased, meaning that the search process is steered by the prior 
experiences and goals of the managers driving it (Cyert and March, 1963: 121).   
Consider these arguments now in the context of the MNC. We suggest that knowledge transfer 
between units can be framed as a process of problemistic search on the part of the recipient.  
Knowledge transfers, by definition, involve both a source and a recipient, but by framing the 
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discussion in this way we are suggesting that a primary driver of the process is the perceptions of the 
recipient.  Several academic studies, for example, have shown that attributes of the recipient are 
significantly associated with the level of knowledge flows (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 
1995), and others have explicitly focused on the recipients’ search process (Hansen and Haas, 2001).  
The broader literature on knowledge management has emphasized the value of a demand-driven 
approach to knowledge transfer (Stewart, 1998; Davenport and Prusak, 1998), and problem-driven 
search is also emphasized in the innovation literature (Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Dosi, 1988; 
Schmookler, 1965).  By framing our research in this way, we are not in any way denying the 
importance of a motivated knowledge source or a well-managed process for achieving effective 
knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1995). Rather, we are simply suggesting that by better understanding 
the process of search that the recipient pursues, we can generate useful insights into the patterns of 
knowledge flow we observe in reality. 
A knowledge flow in the MNC is therefore viewed as being motivated in large part by a 
specific problem facing a specific unit, such as a failure to meet profitability or productivity goals1. 
When faced with such a problem, the managers of the unit begin to search for a solution, and as 
predicted by the Behavioural Theory of the Firm, their search proceeds in a “simple minded” and 
“biased” way (Cyert and March, 1963: 121).  That is, they search on the basis of simple heuristics and 
typically through existing and easily-available solutions, rather than through an exhaustive evaluation 
of all possible solutions.  Once an acceptable solution has been found, perhaps through a knowledge 
transfer with another unit of the MNC, or perhaps through an external relationship, the search process 
stops.  
We argue that in order to understand subsidiary isolation we need to place increased focus on 
the initiation stage of a knowledge transfer—i.e. those events that lead to the decision to transfer 
(Szulanski, 1996:28)—and examine what are the heuristics that managers are likely to use to evaluate 
whether to engage in a process of internal knowledge transfer. We expect that an important 
determinant will be the perceptions (on the part of the potential recipient) of the whereabouts of 
================================================
1 To be clear, this logic does not apply to those cases of HQ-mandated initiatives where the subsidiary has no option whether 
it conforms or not. However, our sense from the research interviews we conducted for this study is that the sales and 
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valuable capabilities within the MNC. These perceptions may or may not be based on solid 
foundations, but from a problemistic search perspective they are likely to provide sufficient 
information for the managers in question to act. 
However, as noted in the introduction, there is now considerable evidence that the evaluation 
of capabilities in the MNC is highly imperfect. Knowledge assets, by their nature, are hard to evaluate, 
and rarely given explicit attention (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Szulanski, 1996).  When combined with 
the sticky and dispersed nature of knowledge in the MNC, the result is often considerable 
disagreement between subsidiary units, and between the subsidiary and the corporate HQ, as to where 
valuable capabilities reside.  For example, in the most comprehensive study of this subject to date, 
Denrell, Arvidsson and Zander (2004) found that the median correlation between the subsidiary’s self-
evaluation of its capabilities, and the corresponding evaluation by HQ, was just 0.28. Similarly weak 
levels of agreement have been found in other MNC studies (Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilennius and 
Arvidsson, 2001) as well as in the analogous literature on supervisor/subordinate performance 
evaluations (Bommer et al, 1995; Harris & Schaubroek, 1988).   
We can expect, in other words, to see large differences in the evaluation of a focal subsidiary’s 
capabilities depending who is asked. And yet at the same time we can also anticipate that these 
subjective evaluations will drive the knowledge transfer process. This is of course the essence of 
problemistic search, in that it is both simple-minded (i.e. based on subjective evaluations rather than 
objective data) and biased (i.e. certain units will likely end up getting higher evaluations for reasons 
that have nothing to do with their actual capabilities). 
 The following matrix provides a simple graphical depiction of the likely knowledge flows 
that follow from the problemistic search process described above.  Recall that our analysis is focused 
on the subsidiary unit that is potentially either a source of knowledge flows to other parts of the MNC 
or a recipient of knowledge flows from other units. The matrix therefore considers how other units 
evaluate the focal subsidiary’s capabilities versus how the subsidiary evaluates itself.  Where the focal 
subsidiary is the potential source of knowledge flows, we can expect it to be approached by other 
=====================================================================================================================================================
marketing subsidiaries in this study received relatively few HQ-mandated directives, and had considerable degrees of 
freedom in the extent to which they engaged in corporate knowledge sharing activities.    
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subsidiaries and the HQ when they evaluate its capabilities as high. These ratings do not have to be 
accurate, and they need not align at all with the focal subsidiary’s own ratings; rather, a high 
evaluation from others is sufficient to begin the knowledge transfer process.  
Where the focal subsidiary is the potential recipient of knowledge flows, we expect that those 
rating their own capabilities highly will be the ones who tend to seek out knowledge inflows, 
regardless of what others think of them (note that this argument is somewhat counter-intuitive, and is 
developed in detail below). Taken together, these arguments suggest that the subsidiaries who engage 
in knowledge transfer either rate themselves highly, or are rated highly by others, or both. These units 
become the “in-crowd”. But those subsidiaries that are rated low both by themselves and by others 
will tend towards isolation: they will not approach others, nor will they be approached. This is the key 
line of argument that links the evaluation of subsidiary capabilities with the phenomenon of subsidiary 
isolation.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
There are of course many other factors that also affect the likelihood of a subsidiary unit to 
engage in internal knowledge flows. But we would expect most of these factors to actually reinforce 
the hypothesized split between an in-crowd of subsidiaries that engage in knowledge flows and an 
isolated minority.  We focus in this paper on two likely factors: the frequency of communication 
between units and their level of reciprocity in knowledge sharing. When these factors are high, the 
perceptions of capabilities among those units that are already interacting with one another is likely to 
rise, which will further reinforce the existing pattern of interaction.  
Having developed the overarching logic for why the phenomenon of subsidiary isolation 
emerges, we will now build the argument leading up to the specific hypotheses in more detail.  
Capability Perception and Subsidiary Isolation 
Consider first the case where the focal subsidiary is the source of knowledge that is being 
transferred either to its peers or to HQs. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) posited that we should expect 
higher knowledge outflows from units with more valuable knowledge. To a certain extent we 
subscribe to this proposition, but the problemistic search framing offers a slightly more nuanced 
perspective on the hypothesized relationship.  Specifically, we would argue that the recipient of the 
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subsidiary’s knowledge (the corporate HQ or a peer subsidiary) perceives the focal subsidiary to have 
high capabilities, and therefore it sees that subsidiary as potentially being able to address the problem 
it faces.  The difference between this argument and Gupta and Govindarajan’s (2000) logic is not just 
semantic, because in our case knowledge flows are triggered by the perceptions of the potential 
recipients of the subsidiary’s knowledge, whereas in Gupta and Govindarajan’s (2000) case 
knowledge flows are driven by absolute levels of subsidiary capability (and are measured as such). 
Our proposition is also consistent with Borgatti & Cross’s (2003:434) finding, at the individual level, 
that a knowledge seeker should positively evaluate the knowledge and skills of the person sought after 
in relation to the problem the seeker is attempting to solve. Thus, we propose formally that: 
Hypothesis 1a. Higher rating of the focal subsidiary’s capabilities by HQ is positively 
associated with a high frequency of vertical knowledge outflows.  
Hypothesis 1b. Higher rating of the focal subsidiary’s capabilities by its peers units is 
positively associated with a high frequency of horizontal knowledge outflows.  
Consider now the case where the focal subsidiary is the recipient of knowledge inflows. Here, 
it is less clear how the perceptions of the focal unit’s capabilities will influence vertical and horizontal 
knowledge inflows. One line of thought would be to predict that low self-ratings would be associated 
with higher knowledge inflows, i.e., that units which assess their own capabilities as high would 
decide that they do not need more knowledge and so would engage in less knowledge inflows. In such 
a case, the logic of the receiving unit being perceived as having weak capabilities is consistent with the 
traditional logic where best practices flow from the most capable units to the less capable ones (e.g. 
Chew, Bresnahan and Clark, 1990; Leibenstein, 1966)2. 
The behavioural perspective developed in this paper leads us to make exactly the opposite 
prediction. That is, we expect that high self-ratings of capability will be associated with high 
knowledge inflows. Two sets of arguments support this proposition.  First, the subsidiary which rates 
its own capabilities highly is likely to be more motivated to engage in knowledge inflows. This 
argument builds on the concept of group-efficacy— defined as a group's belief in its capability to 
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perform a task objective (Bandura, 1997; Gibson, 1999, 2003; Lindsley, Brass and Thomas, 1995)—
which can be a high motivator in a team. Consistent with recent multilevel theorizing, we argue that 
group efficacy has origins at the individual level (Bandura, 1986) and emergent properties at the group 
level (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) and we suggest that it could equally apply to the level of the 
subsidiary management team.  Durham, Locke, Poon & McLeod (2000) showed that group efficacy 
positively affects information seeking. We suggest that subsidiaries with low group-efficacy tend to be 
distracted by ruminations about perceived inadequacies and failures, which consumes limited 
cognitive resources that are needed to process task demands effectively. Conversely, those subsidiaries 
with high group-efficacy tend to be more focused on task requirements and less distracted by 
performance anxiety and off-task cognitions (Bandura, 1991, 1997) and therefore they may be better 
able and motivated to seek, integrate, and interpret information (Brown et al., 2001:5). 
The concept of group-efficacy helps to explain why the subsidiary that rates its own 
capabilities highly would also be engaging in problemistic search.  Essentially, greater self-belief 
creates a motivation for the subsidiary to improve (and therefore fulfil that self-belief), which leads to 
a more explicit and self-critical assessment of the subsidiary’s own strengths and weaknesses.  This 
process is likely to expose aspects of the subsidiary’s activities that are not as strong as managers 
would like, with the result that they engage in a process of search to identify other units that can help 
them to improve further. 
Secondly, our prediction is also consistent with the literature on absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002). A focal unit’s that rates its 
capability high is likely to be more able to recognize the value of other units’ knowledge, and its own 
capacity to assimilate that knowledge. Absorptive capacity is a measure of the overall stock of 
knowledge in a unit, and it has been shown in many contexts that absorptive capacity increases the 
firm’s ability to access and make use of external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002). Lane and Lubatkin (1998) have further argued that absorptive capacity has a relational 
component, so that the ability to assimilate external knowledge is in part a function of the level of fit 
=====================================================================================================================================================
2 This would also be consistent with findings in social psychology (e.g. Weiss and Knight, 1980) where 
individuals with high self-esteem were reliant more on themselves than on their job environments for guidance 
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between the interacting parties. In other words, the knowledge gap between the teacher and the student 
must be at threshold levels for such knowledge flows to occur (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). 
Taken together, these arguments suggest the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a. Higher self-rating of its capabilities by the focal unit is positively associated 
with a high frequency of vertical knowledge inflows. 
Hypothesis 2b. Higher self-rating of its capabilities by the focal unit is positively associated 
with a high frequency of horizontal knowledge inflows.  
Reinforcing Subsidiary Isolation 
The first two hypotheses focused on the demand-driven aspects of problemistic search that are 
the core of our argument. In this section we argue that other elements of the problemistic search model 
(specifically levels of communication and reciprocity) play an important role in reinforcing subsidiary 
isolation. It should be acknowledged that these hypotheses have already been considered in other 
studies. They are developed here because they contribute an important part to the overarching 
argument explaining the existence of isolated subsidiaries. 
The pattern of knowledge flows seen in the MNC is likely to take on a path-dependent form 
(Dosi, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982), whereby the results of past searches for knowledge become the 
natural starting points for new searches, and subsidiary units end up relying on their own experience 
and established knowledge bases to determine what is important and useful (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 
2003:752)3. Viewed in this way, the relationships that form through knowledge flows are likely to lead 
to further interaction and a greater likelihood of further knowledge flows in the future. We expect this 
to occur through two mechanisms – communication and reciprocity. 
First, the frequency of communication between two units makes managers in both units more 
aware of opportunities for leveraging competencies (e.g. Hansen, Nohria and Tierney, 1999; Hansen, 
1999; Hansen and Lovas, 2004; Katz and Tushman, 1979). Individuals may also find it easier to 
=====================================================================================================================================================
in task-related behaviours. 
3In a very interesting study that coincidentally cites some of the firms in our sample, Johanson & Vahlne (1977) 
used this same aspect of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) to explain why the decisions 
 13
contact people who work in other units to the extent that they know them or at least know their 
colleagues. When units seeking knowledge understand the operations of potential knowledge 
providers, they are more likely to identify and retrieve relevant knowledge from them. For example, 
when a focal unit communicates frequently with its peers it provides clues about is own operations 
helping other units not only to assess if the knowledge of the focal unit may be useful for them but 
also it raises the awareness of those units of the potential relevance of their own knowledge for the 
focal unit (Schulz, 2003:447).    
Second, over time we would expect knowledge outflows and knowledge inflows between any 
two units to be correlated with one another.  The argument here is based on reciprocity, that is, the 
idea that those subsidiaries highly involved in sharing their knowledge with others will also be active 
recipients of knowledge (Axelrod, 1984; Kim and Mauborgne, 1991; Kogut, 1989; Schulz, 2003).  
Reciprocity suggests an expectation on the part of the source unit that the favour it is providing to the 
recipient unit will one day be returned, and a moral obligation on the recipient unit to uphold this 
implicit deal (Gouldner, 1960).  Schulz (2003) has shown that reciprocity plays a significant role in 
affecting the knowledge flows in a MNC setting.  Taken together, these arguments suggest the 
following hypotheses. Thus: 
Hypothesis3: The frequency of communication with HQ is positively associated with the level 
of vertical inflows (3a) and outflows (3b) of knowledge; and the frequency of communication 
with other subsidiaries is positively associated with the level of horizontal inflows (3c) and 
outflows (3d) of knowledge.  
Hypothesis 4. Higher frequency of vertical knowledge outflows to HQ is positively associated 
with higher frequency of vertical knowledge inflows from HQ (4a) and   
Higher frequency of horizontal knowledge outflows from the subsidiary is positively 
associated with higher frequency of horizontal knowledge inflows to the subsidiary(4b). 
In sum, the four hypotheses suggest a number of factors that are likely to explain why 
subsidiary isolation tends to exist and persist. We also conjecture, although the cross-sectional nature 
=====================================================================================================================================================
that constitute the internationalisation process (e.g. starting a selling subsidiary or establishing export channels) 
are taken in a path dependent way and are related to operations currently performed by the firm (1977:29). 
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of our data does not allow us to test specific hypotheses, that the patterns of knowledge flows that lead 
to subsidiary isolation seem to indicate that over time some subsidiaries will find themselves in self-
reinforcing spirals of sending and receiving knowledge while the self-reinforcing cycle is likely to be a 
downward spiral for the isolated subsidiaries that neither send nor receive knowledge flows. 
Knowledge flows and subsidiary performance 
Our model suggests an overall pattern of knowledge flows that reinforces existing 
relationships and potentially leaves some subsidiaries isolated from the main flow of interactions in 
the MNC.  We now examine the likely impact that this pattern will have on subsidiary performance.  
This is important because while most of the extant literature implicitly links knowledge transfer and 
performance, only a few studies (e.g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Lord & Ranft; 1998, Tsai, 2001) 
actually measure performance. If there is limited research shedding light on the relationship between 
internal knowledge transfers and performance, the impact of internal isolation on unit’s performance 
remains practically unexamined.  
For instance, although Gupta & Govindarajan (1991, 1994) have indicated the existence of 
isolated subsidiaries they seem to be agnostic about the performance implications of subsidiary 
isolation. More precisely, they proposed that those isolated subsidiaries have low knowledge outflows 
and low knowledge inflows because they are “local innovators”. These are subsidiaries that have 
complete local responsibility for the creation of know-how in all key functional areas but this 
knowledge is seen as too idiosyncratic to be of use in other countries. Similarly, according to Gupta & 
Govindarajan (1991,1994), given the idiosyncratic characteristics of their markets, knowledge from 
other units in the MNC are also not very useful to local innovators. Gupta & Govindarajan (1991, 
1994), however, address neither theoretically nor empirically the relationship between knowledge 
transfers and performance, so we do not know whether subsidiaries with low levels of knowledge 
inflows and outflows are actually local innovators or simply are isolated from the rest of the MNC. It 
seems plausible to affirm that if those subsidiaries are local innovators there should not be any 
significant difference between their performance and that of other subsidiaries. 
We argue, however, that the isolated subsidiaries are in fact in a disadvantageous position 
within the MNC. They are not able to take advantage of the knowledge developed by other units 
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within the MNC (e.g. new products or services). In addition, we suggest that the advantages of internal 
knowledge transfers derive not only from the knowledge inflow itself but also from the knowledge 
transfer process, i.e., from the participation in an internal knowledge network. Powell et al. (1996: 
142) found that biotech firms that do not engage in interorganizational collaboration agreements have 
a liability of unconnectedness and tend to have lower performance than those firms that have larger, 
more diverse alliance networks. They argue that the development of absorptive capacity, the skill at 
managing collaborations, the increased awareness of new projects and reputation as a valuable partner, 
are all serendipitous benefits of collaboration. We believe that similar mechanisms operate in 
knowledge transfers among units belonging to the same MNC. Therefore, we propose that units 
participating in knowledge transfer activities (both sending and receiving knowledge) within the MNC 
enjoy the serendipitous benefits described by Powell et al. (1996). Conversely, isolated subsidiaries 
also have a liability analogous to the idea of “liability of unconnectedness” (Powell et al., 1996) that 
we call “liability of internal isolation”. More precisely, to be an isolated subsidiary the focal unit 
should be isolated both in terms of outflows and inflows both horizontally and vertically. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5. Higher frequency of knowledge inflows and outflows is associated with higher 
performance; in other words, isolated subsidiaries will underperform subsidiaries that are not 
isolated. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Empirical setting 
The study focused on the market-facing subsidiaries—units responsible for marketing and 
sales activities within a particular country—of large MNCs, and in particular on their marketing 
capabilities – their skills in understanding and satisfying customers (Day, 1994).  We argue that 
market-facing units lend themselves well to the study of knowledge transfer within MNCs because 
they serve as corporate links between customers and the major value-adding activities of the MNC, 
and in order to facilitate worldwide value creation they are highly dependent on knowledge transfer 
within the organization (Schlegelmilch & Chini, 2003). Moreover, market-facing units are sufficiently 
plentiful, and diverse in age, origin, and geographic location, that they are likely to provide an 
appropriate context to examine the phenomenon of isolated subsidiaries.  
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Sample 
We approached six large MNCs headquartered in Sweden to take part in the research. Once 
their support had been gained, we were given a lead contact—the corporate marketing manager or the 
equivalent—who provided us with a list of all marketing subsidiaries around the world. The main 
survey consisted of two parts. The first was sent to the managers of 204 marketing subsidiaries in the 
six participating MNCs (Sandvik Coromant, Sandvik Steel, Ericsson, Volvo, Pharmacia and Alfa 
Laval Agri). The overall average subsidiary response rate was 84% (171 responses). See Table 1. No 
particular geographic region was over- or under-represented in the response by the subsidiary 
managers. The second part of the survey was filled in by executives from corporate HQ. Our lead 
contact in each of the firms either filled in the survey himself/herself, or provided names of corporate 
managers with global or regional responsibility for marketing activities in the MNC. The average 
corporate response rate was 88%, i.e. 22 out of 25 corporate/division managers. The two parts of the 
questionnaire yielded the quantitative data upon which the hypotheses in this study are tested.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Measures 
The bulk of the questions were attitudinal, in that they asked respondents to assess the extent to which 
they agreed with the question on a 1-7 Likert scale4. In addition, we also asked a number of factual 
questions, such as the subsidiary’s year of foundation or its number of employees. Finally, we also 
collected some data from secondary sources, such as the geographic distance from headquarters and 
the income per capita in each host country. 
Knowledge flows—We operationalized this construct by asking subsidiary managers about the 
frequency of transfers of marketing knowledge, more precisely (1) transfers of know-how about new 
products and new services and (2) transfers of marketing best practices, on a 1-5 likert scale (1-never; 
2-less than once a year; 3-once or twice a year; 4-around 3-6 times a year; 5-more than 6 times/year).  
These questions were asked for four different sets of conditions: (1) inflows from peer subsidiaries 
================================================
4 Concerned about the possibility of common method bias, we conducted factor analysis including all the attitudinal variables 
that were measured by subsidiary managers. The first factor accounted for only 44% of the variance and four factors were 
necessary to explain 86% of the variance. If common method bias were a serious problem in our data, one factor accounting 
for most of the covariance in the independent and dependent variables should have emerged (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
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(horizontal knowledge inflows); (2) inflows from the MNC headquarters (vertical knowledge inflows); 
(3) outflows to peer subsidiaries (horizontal knowledge outflows) and (4) outflows to the headquarters 
(vertical knowledge outflows).   For each of these knowledge flow directions, responses across the two 
items were averaged to yield composite measures. The means, medians, standard deviations and 
Cronbach alpha values are shown in Table 2.  
Subsidiary performance— To avoid common method bias, we asked the corporate respondents (i.e. 
the subsidiary manager’s boss) to rate the subsidiary’s relative financial performance on three 
dimensions: overall sales revenue, overall market share and operating profit (where 1=much below 
average, 4=average and 7=much above average). Responses on the three items were averaged to yield 
a composite measure of subsidiary performance. Reliability was moderate (0.69).5  
Ratings of focal subsidiary capabilities —We operationalised subsidiary capabilities as their market 
orientation, defined as the continuous collection of information about customers’ needs and 
competitors’ capabilities and the use of this information to create superior customer value (Jaworski 
and Kohli, 1993; Slater & Narver, 1995). We believe that the use of market orientation is particularly 
appropriate in this study because of our focus on the transfer of marketing knowledge (it certainly 
would have not been the best indicator of the subsidiary’s capabilities if we were analysing knowledge 
flows between R&D units, for instance). As we discussed above, we used three perceptual measures of 
market orientation: (1) the focal subsidiary’s self rating of its market orientation; (2) the corporate 
manager’s rating of the focal subsidiary’s market orientation, and (3) the peers’ rating about the 
market orientation of the focal subsidiary.  The focal subsidiary’s self-rating was measured using 
Jaworski & Kohli’s (1993) established index. The scale had high reliability (Alpha=0.81).   The 
corporate manager’s rating of the focal subsidiary’s market orientation was measured through a 3-
item scale which asked corporate respondents to rate, using a 1-7 Likert scale (1=much below average, 
4-average and 7=much above average), each subsidiary’s expertise in (1) collecting market 
information; (2) distributing market information and (3) analysing and acting on market information. 
================================================
5 We are aware that this reliability is slightly below the 0.70 minimum acceptable level. It should be taken into consideration, 
however, that Cronbach alpha values are quite sensitive to short-scales (i.e. it tends to be lower in scales with less than ten 
items) and in this case we have only a three-item scale (Hair et al., 1998:118). 
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(Alpha=0.92) 6. The corporate respondents did not answer the questions on all 21 items because they 
were typically answering for ten or more different units, but we carefully explained these items to 
them before they assessed the subsidiary’s market orientation. Finally, we measured the peers’ rating 
of a focal subsidiary market orientation by asking each respondent unit to vote for the most capable 
subsidiary in (1) collecting market information; (2) distributing market information and (3) analysing 
and acting on market information. The peers’ rating variable is the sum of all votes in the three items 
above received by a focal subsidiary7. 
Isolated subsidiaries—This is a dummy variable that took the value of one only when the focal 
subsidiary met all the following criteria: it experienced (1) vertical knowledge outflows less than once 
a year; (2) vertical knowledge inflows less than once a year; (3) horizontal knowledge outflows less 
than once a year; and (4) horizontal knowledge inflows less than once a year.  Note that “less than 
once a year” is a score of 2 on the 5-point knowledge flow scale (see above), which seemed to be a 
reasonable level at which to define the concept of isolation.  See Tables 2 and 3. However, as 
described below we also tested hypothesis 5 with alternative cut-off points as a way of assessing the 
robustness of our results.  
Communication frequency— based on a simple frequency scale where 1 = daily and 7 = yearly or less 
(see Ghoshal, 1986; Nobel & Birkinshaw, 1998), this scale asked respondents to indicate often how 
they communicated with (a) HQ managers, face-to-face, to discuss operations, (b) HQ managers, 
through other means, to discuss operations. The responses to these two items were averaged to yield a 
composite measure of communication with headquarters (Alpha 0.75). The same questions were 
posed in relation to the communication with peer subsidiaries. Again, responses were averaged and a 
composite measure of communication with peer subsidiaries was created (Alpha 0.74). We reverse-
================================================
6 The first item (collecting market information) reflects Jaworki & Kohli’ s (1993) first dimension (Intelligence Generation), 
the second item (distributing market information) Jaworki & Kohli’ s (1993) second dimension (Intelligence Dissemination), 
and the third item (analysing and acting on market information) Jaworki & Kohli’ s (1993) third and fourth dimensions 
(Response Design and Response Implementation). 
7 For example, in Ericsson we asked 25 subsidiaries to rate which of their peers was best on each of the three dimensions of 
marketing orientation, resulting in a number of votes between zero (i.e. a subsidiary that did not receive any vote at all) and 
12 for each country subsidiary.  The number of “votes” was then assigned to the subsidiary in question as the aggregate peer 
rating of their capability. While a more precise approach to operationalizing this construct would be possible in a dyadic 
research design (i.e. studying individual flows), we believe this is as precise as one could achieve with a nodal design. 
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coded the communication items so that a higher number is associated with more frequent 
communication rather than vice versa. 
Control variables. Tacitness of knowledge—we used Zander and Kogut’s (1995) scale. Respondents 
answered the following questions about their knowledge based on a 1-7 Likert scale, where 1=strongly 
disagree and 7=strongly agree: (a) a manual describing how our activities are executed could be 
written, (b) new staff can easily learn how to perform the services that our local company offers by 
talking to skilled employees, (c) training new personnel is typically a quick and easy job for us, (d) 
new personnel with a university education can perform the services that our local company offers. 
Reliability for these items was moderate (Alpha = 0.67). Tacitness items were reverse coded so that a 
higher number is associated with more tacit knowledge. 
Host country economic level—Different levels of economic development of the country where the 
focal subsidiary is hosted may affect knowledge flows from and to that subsidiary (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). To control for these effects, for each host country, data on per capita income 
(gross national product per capita Atlas method) in 1998 (year the data for this study were collected) 
were obtained from the World Development Report (World Bank, 2003).  
Subsidiary age— Older subsidiaries may have had more time to develop the mechanisms and 
relationships to share knowledge within the MNC (Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstrale, 2002). To 
control for this effect, we included a variable called “Subsidiary age” which is the year when data for 
this study were collected (1998) minus the year of the subsidiary’s foundation.  
Subsidiary size—Unit size may affect the frequency of intra-firm knowledge transfer (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2002; Hansen & Lovas, 2004). We control for this effect by asking respondents to indicate the 
number of employees in the subsidiary, which we convert to a natural logarithm in order to dampen 
the high variability in size and achieve a more normal distribution. 
Use of external expertise—In order to control for the impact of external sources of knowledge (e.g. 
customers, suppliers, competitors), respondents answered the following question about their use of 
external expertise on a 1-7 Likert scale, where 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree: “We 
frequently draw on external expertise when we perform our activities.” 
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Geographic distance—We computed the geographic distance in kilometres between the hosting city of 
the focal subsidiary and the city in Sweden where the MNC’s headquarters were located. In order to 
dampen the high variability in distance and achieve a more normal distribution, the natural logarithm 
of the geographic distance was used in our analyses. 
 
Validity checks—We used SAS V8 (Hatcher, 1994; Lattin, Carroll & Green, 2003) to perform 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to check the convergent validity (i.e. the degree to which specific 
items jointly load on their hypothesized constructs; Judge, 1993) and discriminant validity (Bollen, 
1989, Long, 1983, Judge, 1993) of our multi-item constructs. Factor loadings varied considerably 
(from 0.41 to 0.98) but were all highly significant and corresponded to the hypothesized latent 
constructs. We have also computed the composite reliability for all our latent variables by dividing (a) 
the squared sum of the individual standardized loadings by (b) the sum of the variance of their error 
terms and the squared sum of the individual standardized loadings (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Overall, the values calculated for each of our latent variables exceeded the threshold value of 0.70 
(Nunally, 1978), which suggests that our measurement model demonstrates adequate internal 
consistency8.It is particularly important to report that our results show the discriminant validity of 
horizontal and vertical communications, confirming that they are two different constructs (the 
correlation between them is significantly less than 1.0) and that our two-factor model has a better fit 
than an alternative one-factor model. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC; Boomsma, 2000; 
Hu&Bentler, 1999) was better (that is, smaller) for our two-factor model than for one-factor model 
(AIC 2-factors=12.53; AIC 1-factor=69.96). More importantly, our four constructs used to describe 
knowledge flows (vertical knowledge outflows, horizontal knowledge outflows, vertical knowledge 
inflows and horizontal knowledge inflows) also have discriminant validity. As Table 3 indicates the 
================================================
8 There are, however, two constructs (knowledge tacitness and subsidiary performance) that are slightly below 
that recommended threshold (composite reliability equal to 0.65 and 0.66 respectively). This seems to indicate 
that our measure of knowledge tacitness is not entirely satisfactory and that future research should probably 
adopt other scales to measure this construct. It is worth highlighting here that in order to check the robustness of 
our results, we have run all our models without the knowledge tacitness variable and our results remained 
qualitatively the same. In the case of our subsidiary performance measure, we believe this low composite 
reliability seems to reflect the debate in the international business literature about the inherent difficulties in 
developing reliable scales for measuring subsidiary-level performance (e.g. Andersson, Forsgren and Pedersen, 
2001,). 
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correlation among the four knowledge flow factors ranged from 0.31 to 0.66 with standard errors 
ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, which means that they were all significantly less than 1.0, demonstrating 
adequate discriminant validity (e.g. Bagozzi, Yi & Phillips, 1991: 436). In addition, a four-factor 
solution has a better fit than plausible rival models. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC; Boomsma, 
2000; Hu & Bentler, 1999) was better for our four-factor model than for the one- or two-factor models 
(AIC 4-factors=26.20; AIC 2-factors=108.74; AIC 1-factor=185.48). A comparison of standardized loadings, 
composite reliabilities and average variances extracted between a four- and a two-factor model also 
confirmed the superiority of the former. Although this four-factor model of intra-firm knowledge 
flows has been used before in the literature (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2001), to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that CFA is used to ascertain the discriminant validity of 
these measures.  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
RESULTS 
Before moving on to a discussion of the hypotheses, it is useful to discuss a few descriptive 
statistics associated with the questionnaire data. Tables 4 and 5 contain the descriptive and frequency 
statistics of the four knowledge flow variables (vertical outflows and inflows and horizontal outflows 
and inflows). We confirmed that a significant number of subsidiaries (12.5%) never or less than once a 
year was involved in any of the four types of knowledge flows (see last column in Table 5): these are 
the isolated subsidiaries as defined above. The correlation matrix in Table 6 also shows, as predicted, 
the low correlations between the three perceptions (self, corporate and peers) of a focal subsidiary’s 
capabilities. The correlation between self-perception and corporate perception is 0.14 and between the 
former and peer perception is only 0.04. Peer perception and corporate perception about a focal 
subsidiary’s capabilities show a stronger correlation (0.30) but still very far from 1.0. 
Insert Tables 4, 5 and 6 about here 
Statistical Methods 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) to test our hypotheses. We used Stata 8.0’s regression 
with robust standard errors to counter the effects of heterocedasticity and because multiple 
observations from the same host country may not be independent, we also used robust clustering 
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procedure as implemented in Stata 8.0 for all our models (Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002).9  To 
eliminate any spurious effects due to unobserved differences among firms, we included fixed firm 
effects by entering dummy variables for the six companies in the study10. In order to check for the 
effects of multicollinearity, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) and none of our 
variables was close to the common cut-off threshold of tolerance that corresponds to a VIF above 10 
(Wooldridge, 2002).   
Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to the association between perceptions of a focal unit’s capabilities 
and knowledge outflows from and inflows to that unit. In order to test those hypotheses we included in 
our models both the source’s and the recipient’s perceptions. More precisely, we posited in hypothesis 
1a that a higher frequency of vertical knowledge outflows would be associated with a high rating of 
the focal subsidiary’s capabilities by HQ, and in 1b that a higher frequency of horizontal knowledge 
outflows would be associated with a high rating of the focal subsidiary’s capabilities by its peers units. 
It is worth highlighting that we control for Gupta and Govindarajan’s (2000) absolute measure of  
“value of knowledge stock” of a focal subsidiary by including in all our models the two most 
important proxies—subsidiary size and GNI per capita of the host country—used by them to 
operationalise this construct (2000:477 and 478). In Model 2, we see that HQ’s rating of the focal 
subsidiary’s capabilities is positively and significantly (p<0.01) associated with vertical knowledge 
outflows, supporting H1a. Model 4 also shows support for H1b. Turning to hypothesis 2, we predicted 
that a high self-rating of its capabilities by the focal unit is associated with high knowledge inflows 
both from the HQs (2a) and from its peer units (2b). Models 6 and 8 provide strong support for both 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3 posited that communication with HQs and with peers was positively correlated 
with knowledge outflows and inflows. Model 2 in Table 7 shows that hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
================================================
9 We have also run the models including one dummy variable for each of the host countries in the sample. This reduced 
drastically the degrees of freedom of the models but the results were qualitatively the same as those presented in the next 
session. 
10 Although we acknowledge that a random effects model may in principle produce more efficient estimates, in order to 
obtain an unbiased estimation with such a model, it is assumed that the random error term of each cross-sectional unit is 
uncorrelated with any of the regressors. This is quite a strong assumption that in this specific case is more likely to be 
violated than not then our choice of a fixed effects model. 
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Communication with HQ has the predicted sign, i.e., it is positively associated with vertical 
knowledge outflows, but it is not significant.  Model 4, on the other hand, strongly supports the 
prediction that communication with other subsidiaries is associated with horizontal knowledge 
outflows, providing support for Hypothesis 3b. As Models 6 and 8 show, neither hypothesis 3c and 
nor 3d which predicted the association of frequency of communication with knowledge inflows was 
supported. Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted that the higher the knowledge outflows from a focal 
subsidiary the higher the knowledge inflows to that subsidiary, both at the vertical and horizontal 
levels. Models 6 and 8 in Table 8 provide strong support to our hypotheses, suggesting that vertical 
and horizontal knowledge outflows are positively and significantly correlated to vertical and 
horizontal knowledge inflows, respectively.  
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here 
Finally, hypothesis 5 proposed that isolated subsidiaries have lower performance than 
subsidiaries that are not isolated. We tested this hypothesis by introducing a dummy variable (isolated 
subsidiaries) that took the value of one when the subsidiary has vertical and horizontal knowledge 
inflows and outflows less than once a year and the value of zero otherwise, while controlling for all 
other variables in our model. We expected a negative and significant coefficient for that dummy 
variable. As Model 10 indicates, we found strong support for hypothesis 5 (p<0.01).11 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Robustness checks 
We also performed a number of robustness checks on our results. For instance, we have run 
our models including measures of motivation and absorptive capacity similar to the ones used by 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and our results remained qualitatively the same. We also tested 
hypothesis 5 using a continuous variable (total knowledge flows=sum of the four types of knowledge 
flows) instead of the dichotomous variable. This variable is positively associated with subsidiary 
performance although at a lower level of significance. We also tested hypothesis 5 using different cut-
================================================
11 In order to avoid common method bias (given our performance measure was provided by corporate managers) we have 
not included in our performance models (Models 9 and 10) the corporate managers’ rating of the focal subsidiary’s 
capabilities. If included in the model, this variable is highly significant (p<0.001) and our isolated variable remains 
significant, although less so (p<0.05) 
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off points to define the isolated subsidiaries dummy variable. For instance, we aggregated vertical 
knowledge inflows and horizontal knowledge inflows in one single variable (total inflows, Alpha 
0.75) and vertical knowledge outflows and horizontal knowledge outflows in another variable (total 
outflows, Alpha 0.83) and used the cut-off of two (never or less than once a year) to define which 
subsidiaries were considered isolated. We found a significant negative effect (p<0.01) of the isolated 
subsidiaries dummy. We also tried to use the medians in each type of knowledge flows as the cut-off 
point. As Table 4 indicates, the median in three types of knowledge flows was 2.0 (the same cut-off 
point previously used) but it was 3.0 in the case of vertical knowledge inflows. Once more, the 
isolated subsidiaries dummy had a negative association with subsidiary but this time it is less 
significant (p<0.05).  
DISCUSSION  
Overall, the findings of this study support the idea that knowledge transfers between units 
within a MNC tend to be influenced by a demand driven process, initiated by problemistic search on 
the part of the recipient unit. Three broad sets of insights emerge from the research. First, we showed 
that not only do the three ratings (self, corporate and peer) of a focal subsidiary’s capabilities vary 
significantly (the pairwise correlations among them are quite low, ranging from 0.04 to 0.30) but also 
that they have different impact on knowledge outflows and inflows. In the knowledge outflows 
models, our results supported our argument that what predicts knowledge outflows from a focal unit is 
not how good it believes itself to be, but rather how the recipient rates the knowledge source. In 
relation to knowledge inflows, both from HQs and from peer subsidiaries, it is the recipient unit’s 
perception again that matters. Those units that perceive themselves as highly capable seem to have 
both the ability and the motivation to look out more frequently for external knowledge than those units 
with lower self-ratings of their own capabilities. 
Second, this study provides empirical support for the importance of reciprocity in reinforcing 
existing knowledge flow patterns. We found that knowledge tends to flow to those units that 
frequently share their knowledge with the rest of the organisation. This is likely to end up creating a 
sub-group of units within the MNC that are frequently exchanging knowledge among themselves 
while those subsidiaries that rarely act as sources of knowledge transfers are also unlikely to receive 
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knowledge from other units. We found, however, only partial support for our hypotheses about the 
importance of communication to knowledge outflows and inflows. Communication with HQ does not 
seem to have a significant impact either on vertical knowledge outflows or on vertical knowledge 
inflows. On the other hand, communication with peers has a significant association with horizontal 
knowledge outflows and with horizontal knowledge inflows, when we do not control for horizontal 
knowledge outflows. Taken in conjunction with the reciprocity findings, these results seem to provide 
two interesting insights. A focal subsidiary that communicates frequently with HQ does not 
necessarily engage in more vertical knowledge flows. This may be due to the fact that a certain 
frequency of communication with HQ is mandatory for the provision of routine information while this 
is not necessarily the case with other subsidiaries. On the other hand, when it comes to relationship 
with its peers communication seems to be a good predictor of horizontal knowledge outflows. If we 
refer back to our demand driven model, this may indicate that when a focal subsidiary communicates 
frequently with its peers it is somehow generating some demand for its knowledge.  
Those results in conjunction suggest the possibility of a certain path dependence in knowledge 
transfers within MNCs: as units communicate more frequently and exchange knowledge between each 
other, they recalibrate their understanding of their capabilities and knowledge. As they update their 
understanding of themselves as well as of the units they are interacting with, this positively affects 
their probability of interacting again in the future, creating a dynamic self-reinforcing system, and with 
time units may tend to be locked into a limited set of units with which they interact (Borgatti & Cross, 
2003:442).  It is worth noting that this argument is potentially at odds with Kogut and Zander’s (1996) 
social identity argument, i.e. that one of the advantages of the firm in relation to markets is that the 
former provides the normative territory to which members identify.  Our argument, instead, is in line 
with a more nuanced view of social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), namely optimal 
distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1993). According to this theory, the classification of self (in our case a 
MNC unit) as a member of a highly inclusive superordinate category (e.g. belonging to Ericsson) is 
unlikely to satisfy most units’ needs for differentiation. Hence, classification at that level may 
motivate attention to distinctions between themselves and other category members and an active 
search for subgroup differentiation (Brewer, 1993), resulting in some sort of in-group / out-group 
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dynamic emerging (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). To the extent that this occurs, knowledge is 
more likely to be exchanged between those units that perceive themselves to belong to the same sub-
group within the organisation, leading to frequent knowledge exchanges among units belonging to one 
group of subsidiaries (the in-crowd) while another group (that we labelled isolated) remains alienated 
from these knowledge sharing activities. Clearly these arguments cannot be verified or falsified with 
the focus of the current research, because we have no insights into the way that individual subsidiary 
units identify with other units within the MNC.  However, it is interesting to speculate that many of 
the same patterns of interaction that would be predicted by social identity theory can actually be 
generated through the problemistic search process. Additional research will be needed to shed light on 
the extent to which social identity and optimal distinctiveness have any real bearing on the patterns of 
knowledge flow observed here.    
Third, another major goal of this study was to investigate the impact of internal isolation on 
the isolated subsidiary’s performance. Evidence supported that, all other things being equal, isolated 
subsidiaries seem to have lower performance than those subsidiaries that are not isolated. We believe 
that those subsidiaries that are alienated from the knowledge transfer activities within the firm not only 
do not have access to the knowledge of other units within the MNC (e.g. best practices developed by 
another subsidiary) but also they are alienated from an information network that is a vehicle for the 
rapid communication of news about opportunities and obstacles. We speculate that analogous to the 
idea of liability of (external) unconnectedness (Powell et al., 1996) there may be a liability of internal 
isolation. The causal relationship between isolation and performance is not clear though. In fact, we 
believe that knowledge flows and performance may be self-reinforcing mechanisms, i.e., high 
performing subsidiaries may have the slack resources making them able to share their knowledge, 
while low performing subsidiaries are fighting fires and have to concentrate on their own daily 
activities not sharing any knowledge. Therefore, knowledge sharing provides opportunities for 
improved performance and improved performance providing slack resources for knowledge sharing. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
This study represents an effort to explore a new theoretical and empirical perspective on 
knowledge transfers within MNCs. Notwithstanding the robustness of our results across models and 
the lack of obvious symptoms of biases, we can identify some limitations of this study that should be 
borne in mind for future research. First, we conducted our examination at the nodal level of analysis 
(i.e. the subsidiary). This was useful as a means of identifying isolated subsidiaries, but it also created 
a problem because knowledge transfers are best observed at the level of the dyad or system (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). Future research could build on this study to develop more elaborate hypotheses 
that could be tested at the dyadic level of analysis. Second, despite the fact that we collected some data 
from secondary sources (e.g. geographic distance from headquarters and the income per capita in each 
host country), we used perceptual instruments to measure most of our variables, notably, the extent of 
knowledge outflows and inflows and subsidiary performance. We should also highlight that while our 
study makes an important contribution in ascertaining the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
four types of knowledge flows very frequently used in the knowledge management literature (vertical 
knowledge inflows, vertical knowledge outflows, horizontal knowledge inflows and horizontal 
knowledge outflows), the composite reliability (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) of our knowledge tacitness 
and subsidiary performance factors are slightly below the desirable threshold and additional research 
is needed to further develop scales that can adequately measure those constructs. Finally, the test of 
hypotheses in a cross-sectional research design indicates association, not causality. This raises the 
problem of simultaneity and we suggest the results of this study be interpreted with the necessary 
caution, avoiding strong causal inferences from them. It would be desirable if future research could 
investigate why some subsidiaries are isolated from the knowledge transfers activities within the MNC 
using longitudinal data. A promising avenue for future research is to use longitudinal data to test if 
differences between  “in-crowd” and “out-crowd” units tend to increase, stabilise or diminish over 
time. According to the principle of learning substitution (Levinthal & March, 1993:99), for instance, 
and assuming that a MNC is a nested learning system, where learning occurs at several different but 
interrelated units at the same time, one could expect that learning in one subsidiary would potentially 
be a substitute for learning at another (Levinthal & March, 1993). If this is true, with time the highly 
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capable units would be increasingly involved in knowledge outflows and inflows and would substitute 
for learning in low capable subsidiaries, generating increasing disparities between the former and the 
latter. Hence, these in-crowd subsidiaries would increasingly develop their capabilities, releasing the 
pressure for the isolated units to adapt.  
While the tendency for certain subsidiaries to become isolated is evident in our findings, it is 
important to note that there are ways for MNC executives to break the vicious cycle described above.  
From our research interviews we identified a number of approaches that were used by some of the 
more effective MNCs to bring the more isolated subsidiaries back into the knowledge-sharing 
network, and these are described here.  One was the systematic development of personal networks 
among subsidiary managers. Isolated subsidiaries were typically given an expatriate manager who was 
personally well connected, and who was able to build the relationships with other units that led 
subsequently to knowledge sharing.  A second approach was a careful recognition of language 
problems: one of the organisations in our sample noticed a complete lack of knowledge sharing 
between the large German subsidiary and its Scandinavian peers. On closer inspection, it became clear 
the German boss was not confident in English, so he never participated in the informal discussions that 
led to knowledge sharing. The solution was simply to put a proficient English-speaker in place as the 
deputy to the German boss.  
A third and very different approach was for corporate managers to keep detailed measures of 
how their subsidiaries were performing on process measures as well as performance measures. These 
were used to overcome the gap between perceived and actual capability measures, and thereby to 
facilitate the process of knowledge sharing. Alfa Laval Agri, for example, held quarterly meetings of 
all its subsidiary managers, and it required them to share performance along multiple dimensions so 
that each subsidiary manager could see how his/her unit was doing against its peers. This approach 
helped to reduce the level of bias in internal evaluations of capability, and it opened up the knowledge 
sharing processes to many more subsidiaries.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, this study provided a fresh look at the issue of knowledge sharing in MNCs by 
focusing on the situation facing subsidiary units that are not involved in knowledge sharing to any 
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meaningful degree. We proposed that the recipients of knowledge flows within the MNC engage in a 
process of problemistic search where it is their own motivation and absorptive capacity (rather than 
the attributes of the source unit) and their perceptions about the capabilities of those units they are 
sourcing knowledge from that drive the process of knowledge transfers within MNCs. This knowledge 
flow pattern is likely to be reinforced by a path dependent behaviour where subsidiary units tend to to 
privilege those other units with which they have some communication and from which they can expect 
some reciprocity in terms of knowledge flows. For MNCs concerned about how they might better 
manage their internal knowledge flows, isolated subsidiaries are a real priority, and should therefore 
be the focus of far more attention than they have received to date. 
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FIGURE 1 
Capability Evaluations and Knowledge Flows 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 Subsidiary Response Rates—Overall and by Firm 
 Number 
of units 
Number of units per firm Percent 
Initial mailing  204* Coromant 31, Steel 39, Ericsson 46, Volvo 29, 
Pharmacia 26, Alfa Laval Agri 33 
100% 
Non-responses 33 Coromant 0, Steel 7, Ericsson 14, Volvo 4, Pharmacia 
7, Alfa Laval Agri 1 
16.2% 
Responses 171 Coromant 31, Steel 32, Ericsson 32, Volvo 25, 
Pharmacia 19, Alfa Laval Agri 32 
83.8% 
Corporate responses 154** Coromant 27, Steel 32, Ericsson 21, Volvo 25, 
Pharmacia 17, Alfa Laval Agri 32 
75.5% 
*Two units were excluded from an initial sample since one of the MNCs was closing down its 
operations in these countries. There were few employees left, and their motivation to participate in the 
study was very low. ** 19 corporate managers assessed those 154 subsidiaries. 
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TABLE 2 – Factor Solutions –- Knowledge Flows (The CALIS Procedure – SAS V8)  
Exogenous Variables Manifest variables loadings and t values 
f_si1:. Vertical Knowledge 
Inflows (VKI) 
Inflows of know-how about new products and new services from the 
HQs 
0.65 (t value=7.75) 
 Inflows of marketing best practices from the HQs 
0.88 (t value=10.12) 
f_si2:  Horizontal Knowledge 
Inflows (HKI) 
Inflows of know-how about new products and new services from 
other subsidiaries 
0.65 (t value=8.25) 
 Inflows of marketing best practices from other subsidiaries 
0.95 (t value=12.13) 
f_si3: Vertical Knowledge 
Outflows (VKO) 
Outflows of know-how about new products and new services to the 
HQs 
0.72 (t value=9.83) 
 Outflows of marketing best practices to the HQs 
0.97 (t value=13.92) 
f_si4: Horizontal Knowledge 
Outflows 
(HKO) 
Outflows of know-how about new products and new services to other 
subsidiaries 
0.66 (t value=8.74) 
 Outflows of marketing best practices to other subsidiaries 
0.98 (t value=13.81) 
 
q^_ib=PJ=`çêêÉä~íáçå=^ãçåÖ=íÜÉ=cçìê=håçïäÉÇÖÉ=cäçïë=c~ÅíçêëG=EqÜÉ=`~äáë=mêçÅÉÇìêÉW=p^p=
sUF=
 f_si1:VKI f_si2: HKI f_si3:VKO f_si4: HKIO 
f_si1:VKI ---    
f_si2: HKI 0.56 
(0.08) 
---   
f_si3:VKO 0.43 
(0.08) 
0.37 
(0.08) 
---  
f_si4: HKO 0.31 
(0.08) 
0.55 
(0.07) 
0.66 
(0.06) 
--- 
Gpí~åÇ~êÇ=bêêçêë=~êÉ=áå=é~êÉåíÜÉëÉëK==
 
TABLE 4 – Descriptive Statistics - Knowledge Flows 
 Vertical K- outflows Horizontal K-
outflows 
Vertical K- inflows Horizontal K- 
inflows 
N valid 167 165 164 165 
Mean 2.18 2.18 3.01 2.30 
Median 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 
Standard Deviation 1.01 .90 .932 .956 
Cronbach Alpha 0.82 0.79 0.73 0.77 
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TABLE 5 – Frequency Statistics -  Knowledge Flows 
Frequency of 
knowledge flows 
Vertical K-
inflows 
Horizontal K- 
inflows 
Vertical K-
outflows 
Horizontal K-
outflows 
All four types of 
knowledge flows 
Never or less than 
once a year 
21.3% 53.9% 53.3% 58.2% 12.5% 
More than once a 
year 
78.7% 46.1% 46.7% 41.8% 87.5% 
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TABLE 6  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation matrix   
 
N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Vertical outflow 167 2.18 2.03 1.00
2 Vertical inflow 164 3.01 1.86 0.39 1.00
3 Horizontal outflow 165 2.18 1.80 0.63 0.26 1.00
4 Horizontal inflow 165 2.30 1.91 0.30 0.45 0.44 1.00
5 Isolated subsidiaries 168 0.13 0.33 -0.38 -0.55 -0.38 -0.34 1.00
6 Performance 154 4.10 1.33 0.33 0.03 0.36 0.00 -0.14 1.00
7 Market orientation (corporate rating) 154 4.42 1.35 0.28 -0.07 0.29 -0.12 -0.07 0.65 1.00
8 Market orientation (subsidiary rating) 171 4.41 0.73 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.32 -0.11 0.17 0.14 1.00
9 Market orientation (peer rating) 171 0.90 2.52 0.20 0.10 0.20 -0.01 -0.10 0.33 0.30 0.04 1.00
10 Communication with sub 169 2.95 1.19 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.20 -0.10 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.09 1.00
11 Communication with HQ 169 3.41 1.34 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.37 1.00
12 Geographical distance (ln) 161 7.53 1.14 -0.29 -0.07 -0.29 -0.09 0.03 -0.35 -0.22 -0.09 0.12 -0.25 -0.07 1.00
13 Age 154 27.63 23.06 0.27 0.15 0.26 0.07 -0.12 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.18 1.00
14 Tacitness 171 4.36 0.82 0.12 -0.08 0.13 -0.08 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.27 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.20 0.04 1.00
15 Use of external expertise 170 3.48 1.70 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.15 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 1.00
16 Size (ln employee) 166 3.96 1.50 0.27 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 -0.03 0.45 0.36 0.01 0.19 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 0.31 0.00 0.02 1.00
17 Gni per capita host country 157 19129.87 11724.50 0.25 -0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.08 0.47 0.45 -0.01 0.19 0.17 0.09 -0.37 0.26 0.06 -0.01 0.23 1.00
18 dumsteel 171 0.19 0.39 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.19 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.20 -0.16 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.11 -0.33 -0.06 1.00
19 dumcorom 171 0.18 0.39 -0.05 0.25 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.23 1.00
20 dumerics 171 0.19 0.39 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.17 0.05 0.13 0.04 -0.17 -0.11 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 0.13 -0.04 -0.23 -0.23 1.00
21 dumvolvo 171 0.15 0.35 -0.09 -0.18 -0.02 0.10 0.15 -0.05 0.24 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.17 -0.13 -0.06 0.12 0.18 -0.06 0.09 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 1.00
22 dumpharm 171 0.11 0.32 -0.12 -0.30 0.06 -0.02 0.26 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.24 -0.05 -0.11 0.00 0.08 0.30 0.03 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 1.00
23 dumagri 171 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.17 -0.13 0.07 -0.14 0.06 0.30 0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.11 -0.10 0.16 -0.05 0.00 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.20 -0.17 1.00
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TABLE 7 Results of Regression Analysis of Vertical and Horizontal Knowledge Outflows  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Vertical Outflows Vertical Outflows Horizontal Outflows Horizontal Outflows
Market orientation capabilities - 0.32** - -
(corporate rating) (0.14)
[1.81]
Market orientation capabilities - 0.16 - 0.18
(self rating) (0.20) (0.21)
[1.17] [1.26]
Market orientation capabilities - - - 0.09**
(peer rating) (0.04)
[1.25]
Communication with HQ - 0.20 - -
(0.13)
[1.27]
Communication with - - - 0.50***
subsidiaries (0.12)
[1.32]
Ln geographic distance - -0.31** - -
(from HQ) (0.14)
[1.26]
Age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(.01) (.01) (.00) (0.00)
[1.44] [1.51] [1.45] [1.52]
Tacitness 0.26 0.36 0.22 0.22
(0.20) (0.25) (0.16) (0.14)
[1.08] [1.28] [1.08] [1.18]
Size (lnemployee) 0.45*** 0.38** 0.30** 0.31***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10)
[1.63] [1.85] [1.61] [1.76]
Gni per capita (host country) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[1.14] [1.48] [1.14] [1.23]
Use external expertise -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
[1.19] [1.24] [1.18] [1.22]
_cons -0.16 2.05 2.35 0.63
(1.32) (2.28) (1.29) (1.16)
Firm effects (joint test) ** * Not Sig. Not Sig.
F 3.29** 7.08*** 6.13*** 10.10***
∆F - 6.83*** - 10.55***
R2 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.28
∆ in Adjusted R2 - 0.09 - 0.13
N 138 119 136 136
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors 
between parentheses. VIF values between square brackets.Firm dummies included in all models but not shown
 35
TABLE 8  Results of Regression Analysis of Vertical and Horizontal Knowledge Inflows 
M odel 5 M odel 6 M odel 7 M odel 8
V ertical inflow s V ertical inflow s H orizontal inflow s H orizontal inflow s
V ertical outflow - 0.28** - -
(0 .10)
[1 .47]
H orizon tal outflow - - - 0 .42***
(0 .11)
[1 .60]
M arket o rientation  - -0 .13 - -
(corporate assessm ent) (0 .22)
[1 .88]
M arket o rientation  - 0 .55** - 0 .61**
(self assessm ent) (0 .26) (0 .18)
[1 .20] [1 .30]
M arket o rientation - - - -0 .05
(peer assessm ent) (0 .06)
[1 .27]
Ln  geographic d istance - -0 .19† - -
(from  H Q ) (0 .11)
[1 .32]
C om m unication  w ith  H Q - -0 .02 - -
(0 .12)
[1 .29]
C om m unication  w ith - - - 0 .09
 peer subsid iaries (0 .13)
[1 .51]
A ge 0 .01 0.01 0.01 -0 .00
(0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .01)
[1 .43] [1 .50] [1 .44] [1 .56]
Tacitness -0 .27 -0 .36 -0 .24 -0 .52**
(0 .19) (0 .21) (0 .15) (0 .14)
[1 .09] [1 .28] [1 .08] [1 .20]
S ize (lnem ployee) -0 .01 -0 .25** -0 .10 -0 .22*
(0 .14) (0 .12) (0 .12) (0 .11)
[1 .66] [1 .99] [1 .63] [1 .86]
U se of external expertise -0 .04 0.00 -0 .10 -0 .07
(0 .10) (0 .09) (0 .10) (0 .07)
[1 .18] [1 .24] [1 .18] [1 .25]
G ni per cap ita -0 .00 -0 .00 -0 .00† -0 .00*
(host coun try) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00)
[1 .14] [1 .48] [1 .14] [1 .23]
_cons 7 .28*** 6.44*** 6.64*** 3 .79**
(1 .05) (1 .49) (1 .08) (1 .00)
F irm  effects (jo in t test) *** *** * N ot S ig.
F 4 .08*** 6.27*** 2.88** 5 .75***
∆ F - 3.18* - 12.66***
R 2 0 .18 0.35 0.13 0 .37
A djusted  R2 0 .12 0.25 0.06 0 .29
∆  in  A djusted  R 2 - 0 .13 - 0 .23
N 135 116 136 133
†  p  <  0 .10 , * p  <  0 .05; **p <  0 .01 , ***p<0 .001 .  Tw o-tailed  tests. R obust standard  errors 
between paren theses. V IF  values betw een  square b rackets.F irm  dum m ies included  in  all m odels but no t show n
V ariab le
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TABLE 9  Results from Regression Analysis of Subsidiary Performance  
Variable Model 9 Model 10
Isolated subsidiaries dummy - -0.89**
(0.33)
[1.24]
Market orientation 0.17** 0.17**
(peer assessment) (0.06) (0.06)
[1.21] [1.19]
Market orientation 0.17 0.13
(subsidiary assessment) (0.12) (0.11)
[1.52] [1.28]
Communication with HQ -0.00 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
[1.41] [1.42]
Communication with 0.05 0.02
peer subsidiaries (0.09) (0.09)
[1.66] [1.69]
Age 0.00 0.01†
(0.00) (0.00)
[1.48] [1.48]
Ln geographic distance -0.16† -0.16†
(from HQ) (0.09) (0.09)
[1.32] [1.32]
Tacitness 0.12 0.19†
(0.09) (0.11)
[1.25] [1.30]
Size (lnemployee) 0.20* 0.18†
(0.09) (0.09)
[2.12] [2.04]
Use of external expertise 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
[1.33] [1.32]
Gni per capita 0.00*** 0.00**
(host country) (0.00) (0.00)
[1.47] [1.41]
_cons 1.75† 1.78†
(0.91) (0.93)
Firm effects (joint test) * Not Sig.
F 30.06*** 29.60***
∆F - 8.68**
R2 0.49 0.52
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.44
∆ in Adjusted R2 - 0.02
N 120 119
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.  Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors 
between parentheses. VIF values between square brackets Firm dummies included in all models but not shown
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